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A certain degree of mystification surrounds all military decisions, as if their 
very existence stands for violence and irrationality incomprehensible to a fully 
civilized mind, and only justifiable with the harsh realities of the world. And 
yet, the armed forces in a liberal democracy are under civilian control, as is 
their spending. Their constitution and equipment reflect the role in which they 
are envisioned as well as goals they are intended to achieve. Concordantly, 
this article casts military spending policy as a rational and long-term process. 
Through large portions of the 20th century, explaining military procurement 
would have been focused on explanations of competitive military build-ups. 
Quite contrary to this, the contemporary policy challenges and solutions are 
more often compatible than competitive, due to the fact that the major players 
do not intend to make war on each other. Instead, the environment in which 
war-making is conceivably to take place is shared; an asymmetrical, low-in-
tensity battlefield where once stood the threat of an all out war with an equal 
opponent. The intuitive approach to arming policy takes market structure and 
perceived security levels of countries into account. This article suggests that 
an improved perspective can sometimes be gained using a policy convergence 
framework. In particular, the author examines acquisitions of lighter armored 
vehicles with a fighting role by NATO member countries in recent years. The 
similarities in procurement projects such as Stryker (USA) and FRES (Great 
Britain) are viewed utilizing concepts of convergence mechanisms such as 
lesson drawing and policy emulation as compared to individual problem sol-
ving. A simplified model of military procurement is suggested in order to bet-
ter distinguish these mechanisms. The author argues that in a high uncertainty 
context of military procurement coupled with urgency of the decision process, 
policy emulation can be preferable to technically more rational but higher cost 
policy-making processes.
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To conceptualize military acquisitions as policy might be counter-intuitive for se-
veral reasons.
Firstly, the instruments of war can be equated with means for the use of force. 
The principle of force use being opposite to the usual, the lawful and the rational. 
By a logical sleight of hand, any military procurement is inherently irrational, and 
therefore not a policy. Still, this paper assumes that military procurement can be a 
set of long-term rational answers to a set of well-defined policy questions.
What stands in the way of an applicable approach to military acquisitions is the 
very history of its conceptualization. The field was popular and practically needed 
during the Cold War, and studies of the era, including Richardson’s vastly influen-
tial deterministic mathematical equations and Ostrom’s model of relative-linkage 
(see Moll and Luebbert, 1980), necessarily reflected the Cold War reality of arms 
races.
It seems that, apart from market structure, most contemporary studies tend to 
carry an expressed or tacit understanding of military procurement as a response to 
perceived threats from differences in weapons stocks of respective countries ri-
vals, with some studies allowing some leeway in form of acknowledging the whole 
world as a potential rival (see Golde and Tishler, 2004). While the latter might 
very well be the proper way to explain US military programs, most other countries, 
particularly the smaller ones, do not develop their armed forces in all possible di-
rections at once. Only two European NATO member countries (Great Britain and 
France) possess or are currently developing theoretical technological predisposi-
tions for complicated overseas solo-operations (blue water navy), with Italy and 
Spain having certain elements of these capabilities (green water navy). As far as 
European NATO members are concerned, the vastly improved post-Cold War threat 
environment1 led to reductions in weapons stocks (through exports, scrapping or 
in the very least declines in replenishment), particularly in heavy equipment. What 
these countries can reasonably expect in terms of war are not conventional enemies 
of comparable size, along the lines of security threats prevalent in the first 90 years 
of the 20th century. Rather, the probable mission profiles are those against lightly 
armed concealed opponents on an asymmetrical battlefield, along the lines of wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past decade. 
What most European NATO members can anticipate is a cooperative overseas 
deployment. The role they might wish to fill might sometimes be a specific capa-
bility niche involving heavy equipment (such as tanks, air-ground capability or ar-
tillery), but generally, all armed forces, large and small, will be fielding infantry 
1 The tipping point for Albania and Croatia being the late 1990-ies.
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contingents on a low intensity profile mission (if anything at all).2 The common 
problem is therefore infantry protection3 and fighting capability.
Two types of vehicles are possible contemporary answers to this problem. The 
first is the very wide family of MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles. 
These are basically Jeep descendants, intended to transport soldiers from point A to 
point B, while protecting them from small arms fire (rifles and machine guns) and 
IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) threats. They come in numerous forms and 
are readily available. The second possible response is the type of vehicle intended to 
provide armed support for infantry and carry out fighting missions. As a Cold War 
solution, this role was delegated to heavier tracked vehicles (Infantry Fighting Ve-
hicles and tanks), while the past decade was marked by a noticeable shift to lighter, 
wheeled 8x8 armored vehicles4. This paper will describe this trend and attempt to 
draw conclusions from it.
Data on 8x8 vehicle imports is used alongside the history of major domestic 
projects. Having examined this data, I suggest a simplified model of military ac-
quisitions, which can be used to illustrate the difference between the processes of 
policy emulation and more intensive and rational, if expensive processes.
General Conditions
Even if one should succumb to the basic instinct of describing these procurements as 
reactions to US policy, an imitative reaction of a NATO member country in response 
to a change in US armament cannot be reasonably conceptualized within a security 
dilemma framework, i.e. as responding to a threat. Generally speaking, the better the 
strongest country in the alliance is armed, the safer its allies, but in the Iraq/Afghani-
stan deployment situation, this does not necessarily hold true. One contingent does 
not compete for success with another, and it only free rides on another’s success in 
a general strategic sense. If there are no fronts, and hardly any defined and located 
enemies, the dangers faced (ambushes and IED attacks) are omnipresent. Therefore, 
the problem of military equipment is identical and endlessly repetitive. 
2 For a modestly sized country such as the Republic of Croatia, this is a very general problem, 
as a decision created internally can hardly produce such a battlefield (in sharp contrast with deci-
sions created in USA). A small NATO member can, of course, decide whether or not to commit 
its armed forces to such a battlefield, but names of operations and localities become mutually 
interchangeable. For the foreseeable future, the units intended for operational use will be a rela-
tively small infantry contingent destined to function in an asymmetrical battle context.
3 For a study of the growing importance of the protection of individual soldiers in military ac-
quisitions, see Schörnig and Lembcke (2006).
4 8x8 vehicles will sometimes be used as shorthand for these vehicles except if otherwise noted. 
8x8 implies the eight-wheel drive of these vehicles.
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Herein lies the necessity of an enhanced approach to military acquisitions. Next 
to market structure and security levels, a third element should be taken into account 
when discussing the allocation of defense spending, as the first two can only explain 
the trend in very ambiguous terms. Mechanisms of policy convergence are useful 
in explaining the problem as it covers procurement not based on competition or ri-
valry, but rather on various solutions to a common policy problem.
Economies and overall military spending of respective states provide a back-
drop when discussing options in defense spending. The more lavish the defense 
budget the lesser the need to make hard choices. An infinite financing in military 
matters would produce an infinite number of technical solutions to be joined with 
policy problems as they are formulated. In practice, budgets are not infinite. How-
ever, large economies can afford to pursue various objectives in procurement at the 
same time, manifesting here as procurements of both wheeled and tracked systems. 
It seems that more financially constricted states would face an exclusive dilemma 
between heavier and better protected tracked vehicles vs. lighter and possibly more 
cost-effective wheeled vehicles. Finally, the poorest countries, or the countries with 
least military financing, make no large acquisitions whatsoever. However, outside 
of these constricting factors, what are the driving forces behind specific projects? 
Are they always effective? Are they individual or generic? Rational or irrational? 
This paper will suggest clues as to the answer to such questions.
Limits of a Non-Competitive Model of Military Procurement
While Europe in general seems to have turned toward a different mechanism of 
procurement policy formulation, there is still room for localized Cold War-esque 
behavior. In particular, certain aspects of Greek and Turkish military acquisitions 
indicate that the basic idea of this article cannot be blindly generalized. Their pro-
curements still mirror the more easily understandable way of conceptualizing this 
field: an arms race, or rather an arms competition – a “disaggregated competition 
[...] between pairs of weapons systems for executing mutually incompatible policy 
goals” (McCubbins, 1983: 1). Their orders are a function of those of their coun-
terpart, reflecting them in both size and type, often with unusual tenaciousness. 
For instance, after lavish tank procurement programs of the early nineties (918 for 
Greece, 1123 for Turkey, this minor difference soon made up for by two new Greek 
orders amounting to 200 tanks in the 1997/98 period), both countries had huge, 
yet somewhat obsolete tank fleets by Western European standards. The first tech-
nological step forward was made by Turkey in 2002, ordering a modernization of 
170 M-60 tanks to M3 Sabra standard (the first tank in the Greco-Turkish context 
armed with a 120 mm cannon, as well as protected by explosive-reactive armor, 
better fire control etc.). To this Greece replied with an order of their first 120 mm 
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cannon tanks (Leopard 2A6) in 2003, an order also 170 in size.5 Similar tenden-
cies, albeit usually less pronounced, exist in Greek and Turkish Navy and Air-Force 
inventories.
Locked in competition rather than co-operation, it seems that Greek and Turk-
ish military acquisitions sometimes correspond not to a common policy question, 
but rather to the perceived size and advancement of their rival. The focus of pro-
curement is, untypically for Europe, on the quantity of heavy equipment. It is in-
teresting to note that while the rest of European NATO was mostly focusing on the 
downsizing of armed forces, Greece and Turkey were concerned with the opposite 
(these two processes going hand in hand as most of described acquisitions were ei-
ther ex-US or ex-FRG tanks, made redundant either by downsizing or purging of 
obsolete equipment).
Stryker vs. FRES
Starting in late 1999, the US Army (and Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki in particular) 
published a series of publications (The Army Transformation: A Historic Oppor-
tunity, Joint Vision 2020, Operations, etc.; see Vick et al., 2002) defining the new 
strategic goals combining improved global mobility with increased firepower. They 
were officially stated with the Concept for Objective Force white paper. It postu-
lated the necessity of deployment of a brigade combat team in 96 hours after liftoff, 
a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days anywhere in the world. This 
was impossible with contemporary equipment (with light, infantry focused, easily 
transportable units lacking in firepower, and heavy armored units lacking in speed 
of transport) (ibid.). The general problem was to bridge this gap, to produce units 
both light enough for rapid deployment into full battle and heavy enough to fulfill 
its role. This goal clearly denotes the geopolitical position of USA as one of a global 
problem solver and/or hegemon. While it was acknowledged that technology was 
not yet in existence to provide such a solution, a precursor to such a solution was 
made available very quickly (ordered in 2000 and deployed within 24 months) and 
dubbed firstly Interim Armored Vehicle and then Stryker. Conversely, the Interim 
Brigade Combat Team was renamed Stryker Brigade Combat Team in August 2002 
(ibid.). The decision to name the main maneuver force unit after a piece of equip-
ment suggests the importance of this vehicle for the US Army in general. 
5 Further orders in 2003-2005 added 183 Leopard 2 and 232 Leopard 1A5 (the latter correspond-
ing to the older generation of tanks) for Greece, and 298 Leopard 2A4 for Turkey, ultimately re-
sulting in the ambitious Turkish “Altay” program in 2008, intended to domestically produce 504 
top of the line tanks (all data SIPRI).
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Table 1. UK and US Procurement Programs
Stage USA UK
1) Formulation of strategic 
tasks
A number of initiatives including 
The Army Transformation: A 
Historic Opportunity (2000)
The 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) 
White Paper
2) Identification of 
necessary capabilities 
and capability gaps
Problems – Interim Armored 
Vehicle (Stryker) with further 
technology pending
Problems – bogged 
down for a decade...
3) Acquisitions of lacking 
resources 
First orders in 2000 ...and consequently 
uncompleted
In a similar process, the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain first identified a 
need for greater mobility in the 1998 Strategic Defense Review white paper. This 
was followed by a call for a vehicle program to fulfill a freshly formulated expedi-
tionary role. This program was established as FRES (Future Rapid Effect System), 
and after early concept work in 2001-2003, a two year Initial Assessment Phase 
was announced. FRES was intended to determine the optimal vehicle in three ve-
hicle “families” (Utility, Heavy and Reconnaissance), comprising 16 battle roles 
(HoCDC, 2010).
Still, the program was plagued by continuous delays, and failure to provide an 
answer (and therefore suitable equipment for already fielded units) became a sore 
point between the British legislative and executive branches. In a 2007 report, the 
House of Commons Defense Committee dubbed the FRES program a “sorry story 
of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay” (HoCDC, 2007). By a 
2009 report, the rhetoric escalated to a “fiasco” (HoCDC, 2009), while the Mini-
ster for Defense Equipment and Support joined the fray in October 2009 only to 
refer to the FRES UV program as a perfect disaster. In consequence, FRES un-
derwent a complete restructuring. While there are still acquisition programs un-
der the FRES title, they are now separate projects with more relaxed requirements 
(HoCDC, 2010).
The main difference between the US and UK programs was the British assump-
tion of immediate solvability of the problem, which caused immense delays as well 
as good money being thrown after bad. While the US Army settled for the available 
solution, the UK brass apparently went so far as not to finance urgent (and easily 
available) MRAP programs (non-fighting vehicles intended to counter the IED and 
ambush threat), perhaps due to the fact they were seen as encroaching on the FRES 
program. These were initially funded through Urgent Operational Requirements 
(UOR) utilizing extra Treasury financing. The FRES program seems to be a good 
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argument for a better effectiveness of alternatives to individual problem solving. 
Adoption of the “off the shelf” solution, i.e. the 8x8 Stryker or Piranha III as a best 
policy practice, was rejected, as it never met the existing requirements in protec-
tion, capacity, mobility and development potential (HoCDC, 2007). It seems that a 
process of lesson drawing would necessarily entail a change in perception of which 
specifications are possible. As it were, the very difficult combination of specifica-
tions was insisted upon, and in its light all available “off the shelf” solutions were 
found wanting. Thusly, the British MoD departed on a course of individual problem 
solving, which under the circumstances proved to be expensive both in terms of 
time and financing, with a decade and 146 million pounds wasted (HoCDC, 2010), 
and with no visible results.
Large European Countries
There is nothing technologically new to an 8x8 armored vehicle. Such vehicles had 
been in use for decades before Stryker was chosen as a backbone of maneuverable 
units in the US Army. What is new is the wide variety of roles assigned to such 
vehicles. An important concept is modularity, the idea that the same basic vehicle 
can be fitted with different sets of equipment resulting in light weight alternatives 
to more conventional and heavier vehicles (mainly tracked vehicles). The Stryker 
“family” of vehicles, for instance, comprises ten variants6. They are intended to be 
an element of power projection in their own right, rather than non-threatening peace 
keeping vehicles, or members of massive Soviet-type mechanized drive. To be fair, 
a general contextual technological shift sometimes dubbed RMA7 might have pro-
vided fertile ground for the faith in maximum utility of minimum resources (i.e. ar-
mor and fire power), making this new concept viable.
UK and USA have been compared here in greater detail since their problems 
as well as requirements seemed alike. Yet, a number of European NATO projects 
predated them or developed simultaneously. 
The earliest of currently active programs was the Italian Centauro, with produc-
tion starting in 1991. It was, however for a long time envisioned as a tank destroyer, 
with production ending in 2006 (including export vehicles) (AoWEU, 2009). This 
6 Infantry Carrier Vehicle, Anti-tank Guided Missile, Mobile Gun System, Fire Support Vehicle, 
Mortar Carrier, Command Vehicle, Engineer Squad Vehicle, Medical Evacuation Vehicle, Re-
connaissance Vehicle, NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle.
7 Revolution in Military Affairs – proponents of this term “claim that technological advances in 
computerization and communications, aided by innovations in weaponry, have now altered the na-
ture and practice of warfare by sharply reducing Clausewitzian friction born of uncertainty. Infor-
mation gathering, processing, and distribution promise nearly perfect knowledge of the battlefield 
while other technologies deny the same degree of knowledge to the enemy” (Lynn, 1996: 3).
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version is similar to Stryker MGS version (105 mm gun intended for heavy fire sup-
port) and several Centauro vehicles were leased by USA in order to train Stryker 
MGS crews ahead of schedule (SIPRI). In recent years, five new variants of Cen-
tauro more along the lines of described general 8x8 roles and tendencies were de-
veloped and ordered.
The Boxer program shows both high hopes and dangers of transnational prob-
lem solving in the context of military industry – inasmuch as an equipment type is 
the answer to a common problem. In the late 1990-ies, France, UK and Germany 
entered a joint Research and Development project designed to answer the common 
demand for an 8x8 armored vehicle. Had it been successful, we could have pointed 
to convergence as a result of transnational problem solving, i.e. “joint development 
of common problem perceptions and solutions to similar domestic problems and 
their subsequent adoption at the domestic level” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 784). 
As it were, both United Kingdom and France opted out of the project. UK, having 
drowned 57 million pounds in the project (HoCDC, 2007), went on to a long and 
arduous road of individual problem solving as described above. France opted out 
due to incompatibilities in problem formulation and a desire to support exclusively 
domestic industries. The result was an 8x8 French offshoot known as VCBI pro-
gram operational since 2008 (AoWEU, 2009). This would have left Germany alone, 
but Netherlands joined the project, which eventually received orders in 2006. This 
project takes a somewhat different approach as the Boxer is of comparable weight 
with the new German tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle “Puma”, much heavier than 
most other 8x8 vehicles (not having to comply with the 20 tonne weight limit that 
plagued Stryker and other programs in order to be transportable with the ubiquitous 
transport aircraft C-130). The Boxer would therefore more aptly be seen as an alter-
native to rather than a substitute of tracked vehicles. 
Following is a list of NATO member domestic 8x8 armored vehicles programs 
with orders made to date. 
Table 2. Domestic Programs




Italy Centauro 400 (tank destroyer version 1991-1996)
241 (in four variants, these are now known 
as VBM Freccia)
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A Trend Is Born
Apart from states willing to and in the position to finance their own R&D, there is 
a number of states willing to purchase an off-the-shelf solution. It is interesting to 
note that this group within NATO comprises both very large (USA and Canada) and 
smaller economies, but not UK, Germany, France or Italy. An answer to this riddle 
is probably the position of the defense industry within each country, with the US 
military industry large and occupied enough not to be a primary concern,8 and the 
smaller military industries content with projects awarded via offset programs usu-
ally accompanying these acquisitions. The exceptions are states preferring to have 
domestic industry develop priority programs in hopes of strengthening domestic in-
dustry and, in due course, trade balance through export.
Following is a list of recent imports of 8x8 armored vehicles (orders either 
placed or delivered in 2000-2010 as reported by SIPRI) by NATO members (see 
Table 3 on the next page). The vast majority of orders was placed on three types of 
vehicles, neither of which originated in a NATO country: Piranha III (Switzerland), 
Pandur II (Austria) and XC-360 AMV (Finland). An exception is the Italian Centau-
ro vehicle exported to Spain, but this was delivered almost exclusively in the tank 
destroyer variant (armed with a 105 mm cannon) and does not follow the capability 
specifications of modularity and versatility these orders generally assumed.
Apart from these, Turkey recently acquired a license for the production of Sin-
gaporean Terrex 8x8 vehicles, but has been left out of the table due to unavailable 
data. This makes 12 NATO members with new 8x8 acquisition programs with im-
ported R&D, the vast majority of which were created after the US employing of 
Stryker, and further 4 with domestic R&D. The remaining 12 members (out of 28) 
are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Lu-
xembourg, Norway, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.
This data is, of course in sharp contrast with the 1990-ies. Apart from Canadian 
orders, which followed an established trend, and two orders made in the late 90-ies 
and delivered late enough to be listed in the above table (Danish and Spanish), all 
8x8 armored vehicle orders were of the Soviet BTR series (major orders amounting 
altogether to 547 vehicles ordered by Turkey and 555 by Hungary, with Romania 
continuing the Cold War licensed production). These vehicles are somewhat in-
comparable with the processes described in this paper. The role in which they were 
envisioned is greatly different, they were not intended to rapidly deploy globally 
and hold their own in a pitched battle. Rather they were an integral part of a huge 
mechanized force. Consequently, BTR-60, BTR-70 and BTR-80 are far lighter and 
8 And in fact secure enough to eventually incorporate MOWAG, the company conducting the 
R&D for PiranhaIII/Styker, which was purchased by General Dynamics in March 2003. 
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less protected vehicles. Therefore, their purchases cannot be considered precursors 
to the process described here. However, their existence in large numbers in an in-
ventory may lead acquisition planners to question the cost-effectiveness of a similar 
vehicle. This might help explain why Romania made such a modest purchase and 
why Hungary was not a part of the trend at all.
Table 3. Import Programs
Number ordered Vehicle type Order placed











XC-360 AMV (all) 2007
2008












Romania 31 Piranha-3 2007
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Interpretation
Following is a simplified general ideal-type model of a military acquisition pro-
gram.
Stage 0 Geopolitical role/size of economy
Stage 1 Formulation of strategic tasks
Stage 2 Capability identification
Stage 3 Acquisition of actual resources
Stage 0 is the stage in which the size of economy and overall military spend-
ing provide a hypothetical resource base defining the combined ambitiousness of 
all acquisitions. This stage also provides the process with a motivational force, i.e. 
the role in which a particular state envisions itself. These two factors form an indi-
visible starting point (Russia might wish to have more than one carrier, but is con-
stricted by available financing; China is not, but prefers to delay acquiring such 
capability). Stage 1 is the stage in which general strategic tasks of armed forces are 
defined in accordance with stage 0 (in the case of USA and UK, these were rapid 
global deployment). Stage 2 is the stage identifying capabilities necessary to fulfill 
tasks of stage 1. This is the stage in which 8x8 armored vehicles are identified as a 
needed investment. Stage 3 entails acquisition of equipment, if such resources are 
available.
While it is clear that a trend can be discerned, actual and comprehensive de-
scriptions of mechanisms in play would require studying the procurement processes 
of all countries. In a paper of this size, black-boxing these processes is thus neces-
sary. This requires certain unverified assumptions which may lead to substantially 
different lines of thought. For instance, the unverified assumption of rationality of 
state actors would produce the following argument: NATO members rationally ex-
pect situations in which they will be expected to deploy infantry elements on an 
asymmetrical battlefield, or already face or did face such situations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In an effort to best equip these troops, the best possible vehicles are pur-
chased. It does not matter if this means heavier equipment is neglected, as NATO 
membership, as well as the overall European threat environment, suggest that no 
territorial war is imminent or foreseeable. This assumption would therefore result 
in a diagnosis of either individual problem solving (with each state defining prob-
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lems in like manner and, being rational, arriving at like solutions) or lesson drawing 
(with each state avidly observing all previous experience and incorporating it into 
its own decisions). I find this rationale rather suspect, as an ideal Bayesian learn-
ing process is problematic in times of peace due to the fact that there is no situa-
tion available in which a true test of military equipment is possible. It is difficult 
to reach a singular realistic conclusion as to its adequacy, much less aggregate and 
analyze such conclusions. On the other hand, in times of military operations any 
participant is pressed for time, as best feasible equipment must reach the troops in 
the least possible time.
I am willing to make a different unverified, yet logical assumption, in that stra-
tegic tasks are generally connected with the size of economy and the global role. 
Only three NATO states possess nuclear armaments: USA, UK, and France. These 
happen also to be the only three states with global power projection capabilities (in 
case of UK, the large aircraft carriers needed are under construction). Therefore, 
only the three states possess theoretical predispositions for an individual overseas 
operation. All other states will, even theoretically, more than likely be caught in a 
quagmire of collective political decision making pending a cooperative operation. 
Therefore, it follows that rapid deployment should be a far lower priority for small-
er countries. Considering the origin of contemporary 8x8 armored vehicle programs 
as solutions to the problem of rapid global deployment of substantial combat capa-
ble forces, it would seem that a transplantation of stages 2 and 3 is made by smaller 
countries, with rationalizations taking place of stage 1. This suggests emulation, 
in that it is not a “search for effective solutions to given problems”, but “a simple 
copying of policies adopted elsewhere” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 784). However, 
even if this process provided a number of countries with capabilities they did not ac-
tually need at the expense of capabilities they might actually require should the glo-
bal security situation deteriorate, it also means that troops deployed abroad are well 
equipped. Indeed, keeping in mind the expected situations, pointing at an over-kill 
in equipment could even be seen as distasteful considering the alternative of under-
protection suffered by the troops equipped by the non-emulating British Ministry of 
Defense. In this respect, emulation would be a wholly rational response considering 
the urgency to protect soldiers in a battle-zone combined with the much lower costs 
of information compared to alternative processes (see Holzinger and Knill, 2005). 
The described reduction to the link of stage 0 and what the strategic tasks of 
stage 1 should be also helps to avoid two substantial problems. Firstly, the blurred 
line between two possible types of circumventing the observed high cost of infor-
mation, namely between emulation and bounded learning. The latter is a non-Baye-
sian learning process utilizing analytical shortcuts to reduce massive and costly 
information of dubious quality to merely the relevant data (see Meseguer, 2006). 
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Without an arduous research into links between military doctrine and the decision 
making processes behind each order, the difference between an idiosyncratic strate-
gic task and mentioned rationalizations in stage 1 becomes a matter of opinion. In 
turn, the difference between mindless emulation and a solution well adapted to lo-
cal needs also becomes a matter of opinion. Secondly, even with the required level 
of research, it would be impossible to establish the level of realism of stage 1, bear-
ing in mind the constructivist argument that both “legitimate ends and appropriate 
means are shared social constructs” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007: 451). It 
follows that, even should stages 1, 2 and 3 be well connected, the entire package 
might represent a broad social construction within NATO, not necessarily reflect-
ing the security needs of a specific state. One might also invoke the type of emula-
tion described by Fabrizio Gilardi as “taken for grantedness” (Gilardi, 2003) in that 
a set of equipment solutions coupled with a set of goals may become “the normal 
or obvious thing to do in given contexts” (ibid.: 7), without real attention given to 
alternatives.
Ignoring proclaimed goals in favor of an assessment of a country’s economic 
position and global role, while probably not applicable outside of this specific con-
text, allows for this analytically useful simplification to the described dichotomy.
Failed or Optimal Strategies?
This paper discusses a trend in 8x8 acquisitions, yet this in itself is connected with 
another distinct level: the specific role expected to be filled by these vehicles. The 
same solutions do not necessarily reflect the same problem definition. The most 
dramatic policy in this respect is to forego the use of tracked vehicles altogether. 
In 2001, Canada, the earliest NATO 8x8 emphasis proponent, decided to stop re-
plenishing its tank fleet. The existing vehicles would have been used until they ran 
down, with 8x8 Piranha derivative vehicles taking their place entirely. Yet, the eva-
luation of this policy in the field in Afghanistan proved that heavier vehicles were 
irreplaceable (McLeary, Nativi and Eshel, 2011), and in 2007, Canada placed orders 
for 102 Leopard 2 tanks (SIPRI). It is interesting to note that it was not territorial 
defense considerations that prompted this decision; it was the same low intensity 
battlefield that the wheeled armored vehicles were thought so suited for. This deci-
sion is also noteworthy considering other armies intent on replacing tracked with 
wheeled vehicles or not filling the described fighting vehicle role at all.
It is not uncommon for a piece of equipment with military use not to perform 
with expected effectiveness. Moffat and Gardener conducted a series of participatory 
workshops combined with a Game Theory framework intended to identify the reasons 
for failure of military acquisitions projects to deliver what was agreed between state 
(in their case, the British Ministry of Defense) and industry actors. They recognized a 
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pattern of “conspiracy of optimism” in which “optimistic strategy is the game theore-
tically rational response in a given acquisition context” (Moffat and Gardener, 2006: 
2). The benefit to both MoD and industry was maximized when assessments were the 
furthest from realistic in high uncertainty conditions, and a “conspiracy of optimism” 
became an evolutionarily rational response (Moffat and Gardener, 2006). In the con-
text of this paper, this makes perfect sense as far as deployed troops are concerned 
with orders placed and equipment actually acquired. Considering Canada, the actual 
field experiences with various types of equipment caused a reversal of the previous 
optimistic decision to replace tanks with lighter vehicles. 
What this suggests in the context of policy convergence is that a type of ration-
al and even expected behavior in Pentagon – military industry relations, can con-
ceivably trigger an avalanche of procurements not suited to real security challenges 
of states placing the orders. On the other hand, if the “conspiracy of optimism” had 
prevailed in the British FRES program, as it might have in most other countries, the 
British troops might have been far better equipped to fulfill their mission.
Conclusion
There is ample evidence to suggest a new trend in military acquisitions of armored 
8x8 vehicles. The process of procurement can be extremely complex, as individual 
problem solving usually entails high information costs, both in terms of time and 
finances. This process can however be made less expensive by emulating policies. 
I have suggested a simplified model of military acquisitions in four stages: size of 
economy/military spending coupled with geopolitical role (0), definition of general 
strategic tasks (1), capability identification (2) and equipment acquisition (3). Emu-
lation in a military context might entail a transplanting of stage 2 as a national po-
licy, with a rationalization taking place of stage 1. This may or may not be a sound 
strategy, as its performance depends not only on the actual acquisition (stage 3), 
but also on the specific role in which the equipment is expected to perform. In the 
case discussed in this paper, this sometimes involves expectations of 8x8 vehicles 
to serve as tank replacements. These expectations can be either explicit and imme-
diate (Belgium, Canada), or tacit and long term (with heavier equipment being a far 
lower priority – as in the case of the Croatian Degman M-95 tank development). 
The conspiracy of optimism concept provides us with clues as to how such high 
hopes are possible. Such an assumption is immediately problematic only if a piece 
of equipment is found lacking in a specific role when tested in a specific situation 
(as it was in the case of Canada). This suggests that a transplantation of stage 2 can 
be a welcome mechanism (assuming that the global security situation will not de-
teriorate) and, lives being at stake, it is certainly preferable to a blocking of stage 2 
due to a process of individual problem solving gone awry.
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